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The Geography of Warscape 
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Abstract 
This article elaborates a heuristic approach to understanding the geography of warscape 
from a theoretically informed perspective. It argues that agency in protracted civil war 
emerges at the ambiguous interface of different, competing systems of power and 
authority. In order to account for the multiple trajectories of threat and opportunity that 
warscapes offer to different social actors and at different times and places, the article 
proposes the concept of ‘governable order’, which is derived from a critical review of the 
literature on ‘social navigation’ and ‘governable space(s)’. The usefulness of combining 
these three concepts is illustrated by two empirical vignettes. They demonstrate the 
dynamics of governable spaces in distinct phases of the Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka civil 
wars. The two cases highlight the temporal and territorial fluidity of governable spaces, 
which both constrain and enable warscape inhabitants’ agency. 
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Introduction 
In Culture in Chaos, Stephen Lubkemann suggests that most studies dealing with the 
‘condition of war’ are split into two camps.1 Either they emphasize how violence is 
organized or how warscape inhabitants – the anonymous heroes of ‘ordinary’ men and 
women – handle this violence.2 ‘Warscape’, a concept originally proposed by Carolyn 
Nordstrom, are landscapes characterized by brutal violence, political volatility, physical 
insecurity and the disruptions and instabilities that exist in many civil war zones that 
different social actors navigate through.3 Warscapes are the site of a ‘complex and multi-
dimensional agenda of social struggles (…) and life projects’ that take form in a context 
in which ‘the certainty of uncertainty has become a fundamental reality in the lives of 
social actors’.4 Lubkeman emphasizes that while violence punctuates the lives of 
warscape inhabitants, it does not continuously script it. Thus, war is not a matter of ‘all 
terror all the time’.5  
In their 1995 publication Fieldwork under fire, Antonius Robben and Carolyn 
Nordstrom set out a research agenda to study ‘the everyday experiences of people who 
are victims and perpetrators of violence.6 Nordstrom reminds us that ‘individuals do not 
make up a generic group of “combatants”, “civilians”, and “casualties” but an endlessly 
complex set of people and personalities, each of whom has a unique relationship to the 
war and a unique story to tell’.7 At the same time, she suggests, these actors construct 
‘social order out of chaos’.8 Lubkemann adds that ‘the effects of violence [are] often 
contradictory, imposing new constraints while providing means for extending agency’.9 
Inhabiting a warscape is thus not merely a matter of coping with violence, but is deeply 
entrenched in ‘the pursuit of a complex and multi-dimensional agenda of social struggles, 
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interpersonal negotiations and life projects’.10 It is therefore difficult to draw a clear line 
between the social conditions of war versus those of non-war as social actors continue to 
struggle throughout both conditions in a peace-to war continuum.11 
While we subscribe to Lubkemann’s argument above that war is not a matter of ‘all 
terror all the time’, we suggest a further qualification: war is not a matter of ‘all terror all 
the time’ all over the place.12 In other words, we propose an understanding of warscape 
that explicitly deals with its inherent geography. We posit that warscapes are not per se 
‘socially unstable places’, but differentiated arenas, networks and connections of 
relational spaces in which distinct human trajectories co-exist.13 As social spaces 
warscapes are always under construction in the sense Doreen Massey alludes to: ‘the real 
import of spatiality is the possibility of multiple narratives.’14 Indeed, violent conflict can 
be a threat or an opportunity for those immediately concerned, often at the same time. 
Whether violence is threatening or offers opportunities depends, however, on the specific 
spatial and temporal configuration of power, authority and economic flows, which open 
certain trajectories while foreclosing others.15 These trajectories may vary in different 
places and at different times in a given warscape. In other words: violence has 
ambiguous, often contradictory effects on agency at different times, in different places 
and for different individuals. 
In this paper, we develop a heuristic approach for the study and interpretation of the 
geography of warscapes. The proposed heuristics are informed by our own fieldwork in 
conflict ridden parts of Sri Lanka, Guinea and Ethiopia. Our objective is a theoretically 
informed understanding of warscape inhabitants’ strategies in contexts of multi-scalar, 
highly contested and spatially differentiated systems of authority and power. For this 
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purpose we combine two arguments that have so far been discussed separately; Michel de 
Certeau’s distinction between tactics and strategies and its adoption in the study of 
warscapes by political anthropologists on the one hand, and geographer Michael Watts’ 
work on governable spaces on the other hand. We argue that, in combination, the 
concepts of ‘social navigation’, ‘governable spaces’ and ‘governable orders’ are 
particularly well suited to scrutinize warscapes in which violent competition over 
authority creates multiple trajectories of threat and opportunity and makes these highly 
malleable in space and time. Our heuristic framework provides a starting point for 
understanding the spatial dimensions of war, which we consider both as a ‘violent 
condition’ and a ‘social condition’.16 The article is divided into three sections. The 
following section critically reviews and (partly) reformulates the concepts that are at the 
core of our framework. Subsequently, two empirical vignettes from the Sierra Leone and 
Sri Lanka civil war illustrate the usefulness of our proposed heuristics in understanding 
the geography of warscape. Using own field material and other authors’ ethnographies 
enables us to demonstrate the significance of these concepts in different settings. Finally, 
we conclude by drawing attention to the inherently geographic nature of protracted 
violent conflict and the agency of warscape inhabitants. 
 
Understanding the geography of warscape 
‘No matter how brute the force applied to subjugate a people, local-level behaviours arise 
to subvert the hold violence exerts on a population’ writes Nordstrom.17 This resonates 
with our starting proposition that actors, including the subaltern or the weak, have room 
for manoeuvre within warscapes. In order to understand this room for manoeuvre it is 
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helpful to adapt an actor-oriented perspective that accounts for how individuals navigate 
through difficult terrains of violence and conflict and to consider the different and 
flexible roles that these individuals adapt and display in their everyday practices in 
different times and places. But at the same time, this flexibility is constrained and refined 
by a system of authority and power that delimits the agency of warscape inhabitants. In 
this section, we develop a tentative heuristics that brings two sets of arguments into 
conceptual conversation: Michel de Certeau’s tactic-strategy distinction and its adoption 
in study of warscapes and Michael Watts’ work on governable spaces. Although we are 
critical of the dichotomy made between tactics and strategies, we employ Vigh’s social 
navigation metaphor and fuse it with a spatially more explicit conceptualisation of Watts’ 
governable spaces. The ensuing theoretical detour examines the genealogy of and the 
relations between the three concepts of ‘social navigation’, ‘governable spaces’ and 
‘governable orders’, which we consider of critical importance for the study of the 
geography of a warscape. 
 
From tactics/strategies to social navigation 
De Certeau’s sociology of the everyday and his distinction between strategies and tactics 
are a useful starting point for understanding individuals’ room for manoeuvre in a 
warscape. De Certeau suggests that the everyday life of ‘making do’ is an art, an ‘art of 
doing’ by help of which individuals create, produce, and invent their lives. He 
particularly looks at how ordinary individuals operate within and yet against a dominant 
culture. In his words 
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‘the goal is not to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary 
technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, 
tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of 
“discipline”. Pushed to their ideal limits, these procedures and ruses of consumers compose 
the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book’.18 
De Certeau strongly rejects the passivity and determinism, which he discerns and 
criticizes in Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the social actor. While the latter insists on 
the socially stratified character of cultural practices, de Certeau views cultural practices 
as largely gratuitous, a means of circumventing power rather than bidding for it.19 
Analytically, de Certeau’s distinction between tactics and strategies is problematic, 
though, as it bears the danger of reproducing a dichotomy between domination and 
resistance that appear fixed in space and time. Massey rightly criticizes that de Certeau 
conceives of power in society as a monolithic order, which the tactics of the weak try to 
circumvent.20 Massey underlines that the coherence of ‘the powerful’ should not be 
overestimated and neither should the potential power of ‘the weak’ be minimized. She 
goes on to argue that de Certeau implicitly assimilates strategy with ‘place’ while tactics 
depend on ‘time’. In this reading, space appears as fixed, while time allows dynamism. 
Tactics allow navigating around the powers of place in order to come by over time. 
Massey’s alternative conception of space holds that space is an open and ongoing 
production; space is an event, not a static closure and therefore, open to change.21 In line 
with Massey’s suggestions, Nordstrom suggests in Shadows of War that we need to 
understand the convoluted networks of different actors in the context of violence and 
conflict and how they are reshuffled in space and time.22 
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Most contemporary ethnographers of violence and conflict tend to consider the 
elbow room of ordinary people in warscapes as confined to tactical rather than strategic 
agency. Alcinda Honwana for example describes the tactical agency that child soldiers in 
Mozambique’s former civil war disposed off.23 Mats Utas makes a similar point in his 
analysis of a Liberian woman’s civil war experiences when he suggests that ‘tactic 
agency forms part of the trajectories of the weak’.24 As people cope with and adjust to 
political disorder, violence and domination of the powerful, their agency is reduced to 
tactical moves. This argument mirrors James Scott’s famous injunction of the ‘weapons 
of the weak’, the ‘silent’, ‘hidden’ strategies by Malaysian peasants who resist power, but 
do not transform it.25 This kind of reasoning falls prey to the same criticism that Massey 
levelled against de Certeau; ethnographies that employ de Certeau’s tactics/strategies 
distinction tend to ‘romanticize’ tactics as the ‘weapons of the weak’ who manage to 
cleverly navigate across and between conflict lines and actors characteristic of warscapes. 
Henrik Vigh has criticized this dichotomization of powerful and weak in the 
warscape literature: ‘seeing strategy as acts of the powerful and tactics as acts of the weak 
disregards the fact that a terrain is an intrinsically multilayered phenomenon containing a 
multitude of negotiations of power’. 26 Vigh proposes the concept of ‘social navigation’ 
that ‘is able to encompass “instability” and movement in our understanding of action 
while building on an awareness of both individual will and social forces’.27 Two aspects 
are central in Vigh’s conceptualisation of social navigation. First, it underlines how actors 
concomitantly steer through their immediate and imagined lifeworld, both in relation to 
their current placing within a given order and to their imagined future placing. Second, 
the navigation metaphor grasps how actors behave in relation to other actors, to a given 
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predominant social order, and to intricate interactions between actors, events and the 
shifting constellations of these social orders. Social navigation in short ‘is praxis as 
motion within motion’.28 Navigating in perilous and life-threatening warscapes demands 
actors to redraw trajectories, strategies and tactics of agency. With increasing navigation 
experience, these tactics and strategies also become ingrained in specific everyday praxis.  
 
Governable space(s) and governable order(s) 
Social navigation is, however, always situated in particular relations of domination and 
this is where we find Watts’ writings on ‘governable spaces’ useful as it adds the more 
structural dimension of social order to the question of social navigation and agency.29 
Watts’ concept of ‘governable space’ is inspired by Nikolas Rose’s discussion of the 
spatial dimension of government and authority in Michel Foucault’s writings.30 Rose 
defines governable space(s) as the ‘modalities in which a real and material governable 
world is composed, terraformed, and populated’.31 Watts further operationalizes the idea 
of a governable space, which, in his interpretation, ‘necessitate[s] the territorializing of 
governmental thought and practice’, in short it is a ‘political thought territorialized’.32 In 
Watts’ reading, governable spaces expand and contract as the result of particular relations 
of domination that transcend formal spatial categories of the container type. Watts 
highlights the multiple, dynamic and interrelated forms of real-life power that co-exist at 
the same time. His account of governable spaces in Nigeria ‘reveals ragged, unstable, 
perhaps ungovernable, spaces and analytics of government that hardly correspond to the 
well-oiled machine of disciplinary and biopower’ that some of the Foucauldian derived 
analysis suggests.33 
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While we concur with Watts’ analysis of ragged, unstable spaces, we want to suggest 
that his conceptualization warrants further scrutiny of the inherent spatialities of 
governable spaces. Watts analyses social conditions and institutional logics as ‘social 
spaces’ rather than as the geography of violence. His usage of ‘governable space(s)’ in 
the Niger Delta conceptualises interrelated systems of power (‘space of chieftaincy’, 
‘space of indigeneity’, ‘space of nationalism’) in terms of their simultaneous production, 
but labels and describes them largely independently in three separate sections that do not 
elaborate the intricate and convoluted connections between these spaces and their 
malleability in space and over time.34 Indeed, our endeavour is to understand the 
configuration, the entanglement and interplay of these multiple ‘governable spaces’ in a 
given locality and at a given time, i.e. their specific spatialities, as rationales of rule 
territorialized. 
While a social figuration transcends a given locality, the in situ practices of actors do 
not. We therefore suggest the notion of governable order, which is closer to Foucault’s 
understanding of governmentality, to grasp the rationale of a system of authority.35 To 
distinguish the analytics of governable order and governable space, we define a 
governable order as a non-territorial, social figuration of power, norms and rules that 
transcends spatial scales and whose working hinges on multiple spatial connections, both 
material and non-material. Governable orders sediment into a specific hierarchy of rules 
and authoritative powers, varying at different moments in time in a given place and in 
different places at the same moment in time. Such reading of governable space as an 
amalgam of multiple, overlapping governable orders resonates with Massey’s concept of 
space as ongoing production.36 In our heuristics, the concept governable order denotes 
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the social figuration of a system of power, norms and rules – i.e. the rationale of an order, 
while governable space describes the spatial configuration of different overlapping 
governable orders in a specific place and time, i.e. how these orders and their rationales 
become effective in a particular social condition, place and time.37 In other words, 
governable spaces are territorialized regimes of co-existing governable orders and neither 
stable nor rigid. We think that this differentiation is useful to better grasp the dynamics of 
‘ragged, unstable, perhaps ungovernable spaces’ that are a defining feature of 
warscapes.38 This is where Vigh’s navigation metaphor links up with the logic of 
governable spaces: warscape inhabitants, faced with the ragged, unstable dynamics of 
multiple systems of authority, navigate through the perilous terrain of a given power 
topography and at the same time contribute to its re-shaping. 
At a given time, different governable orders co-exist at a particular place, each with 
different sources of normativity, legitimation and coercion (e.g. the state’s order, the 
order imposed by security forces, the order coercively implemented by rebels or 
combatants, etc.). These governable orders are not equally formative as they create 
different moments of inclusion and exclusion of different groups and individuals. The 
realm of power of each of these orders depends on the degree of their legitimisation in 
everyday life, the relative political and coercive power of its representatives and their 
reproduction through social practices. These governable orders exert influence in 
particular places and moments and with varying specifications for different actors. They 
thereby act as nodal points of historically and spatially superimposed layers of political 
authority. Although often oppressive in the context of warscapes, governable orders may 
be considered as legitimate by certain segments of the population. As the accumulative 
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outcome of actor strategies and social practices, governable orders are highly sociable, 
relational and subject to transformation over time. 
 
Empirical vignettes: Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka 
We demonstrate the expediency of these three interrelated concepts by applying them to 
two distinct warscapes that we are familiar with. The first empirical vignette sketches the 
shifting dynamics of governable spaces in Sierra Leone’s civil war that lasted from 1991, 
when rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered the country from the 
Liberian border, until 2002, when President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah officially declared its 
end. It draws on a rich ethnographic literature of the Sierra Leone conflict and re-reads 
this literature in terms of the geography of warscape that it reveals. The Sierra Leone 
empirical vignette highlights the rise and fall of governable spaces over a longer time 
period, retracing the emergence and subsequent destabilization of the bush camps in the 
first half of the 1990s in the south-eastern part of the country. The second empirical 
vignette comes from Sri Lanka’s civil war and here from a particular moment and place: 
the eastern part of Sri Lanka prior to the ceasefire agreement in 2002. The material from 
Sri Lanka comes from own field work conducted by one of the authors. This case 
illustrates the short-term dynamics of governable orders over space and time and how 
these dynamics produce highly volatile, but relatively stable governable spaces. We use 
these two empirical vignettes mostly for illustrative purposes: The empirical illustrations 
are not meant to provide a comprehensive account of either of the two warscapes, nor do 
we claim that these two short vignettes exhaust the empirical field that can be analysed 
with our suggested heuristics. 
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South-eastern Sierra Leone, ca. 1991-1996 
In Sierra Leone’s civil war, the geography of warscape was most visible in the shifting 
spatial figurations surrounding the bush camps of the rebel RUF. At the early stages of 
the civil war between 1991 and 1996, the RUF operated from these bush camps where it 
also trained and ‘ideologized’ its cadres and recruits.39 The camps were concentrated in 
the southeast of Sierra Leone and became spaces of RUF’s internal militarization. The 
bush based fighting was accompanied by the kidnapping of young men and women into 
sexual, domestic or military servitude. At the same time, the camps attracted civilians 
who were not considered as RUF recruits, but provided services to the rebels, their wives, 
husbands and children. The camps’ social order was based on strong social and 
genealogical bonds, which made the distinction between combatant and non-combatant 
inhabitants highly malleable. Women, for example, could be part of the RUF cadre, 
become victims of sexual harassment or work successfully in the service sector – 
sometimes they would experience all of these at the same time. The forests surrounding 
the bush camps were marked by their own distinctive governable space: while these 
territories provided some kind of protection against harassment from government troops, 
they were confined to a regime of intimidation and expropriation that the RUF imposed 
on the camp inhabitants, which made it difficult to escape from either the camps or the 
surrounding bush.40  
But the governable space of the bush camps turned into turmoil when governmental 
forces started to successfully attack the bush camps after 1996 and penetrated the 
surrounding territories. The camps and the bush became spaces of risk and uncertainty. 
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Community organized hunter defence troops, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) or 
kamajor, scoured the forests. They had been recruited by the government as vigilantes 
who were more familiar with the forest terrain than regular governmental troops.41 As a 
result of these military manoeuvres, a new governable order of violence, intimidation and 
expropriation emerged that made life for the forest inhabitants very troublesome. Had 
they accustomed themselves to the governable space that the RUF’s bush camp presence 
had created and enjoyed relative protection from government troops, living in vicinity to 
RUF bush camps exposed them to risk and increased their vulnerability. The intrusion of 
the CDF fighters, and thereafter, of government troops into formerly rebel controlled 
territories created a much more ambivalent situation, resulting in the presence of different 
belligerent groups, each imposing its own governable order that shifted with their 
presence and absence in a particular place and time. 
Non-combatants and other camp inhabitants who were not RUF cadres left the area 
in large numbers as they attempted to cut off their ties with the rebels in order to avoid 
harassment from CDF and government troops. This unsettled the fragile social 
coexistence that had emerged in the governable space of the camps and the bush prior to 
the government attacks. Steven Archibal and Paul Richards have argued that in the initial 
period of the war, the RUF was an insurgent group without strictly authoritarian rules and 
functioning. Cohesion was maintained through multiple social, ideological and economic 
bonds and obligations between RUF cadres and the amalgam of camp and nearby bush 
inhabitants. When the CDF and governmental forces penetrated their territory, RUF’s 
internal unity was destabilized and the organization disintegrated into different factions. 
Commanders and the rank and file acted increasingly independently from their superiors, 
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plundering, looting and killing the inhabitants of the areas that they conquered.42 In this 
situation, a highly flexible governable space emerged as a function of the overlapping 
governable orders of various marauding belligerents that shifted according to their 
presence or absence. When one RUF group left an area, the next would come sooner or 
later and their presence was felt even in their absence. Interestingly, when the war ended 
in 2002, hardly any CDF fighters were demobilized. The hunter defence units seemed to 
have vanished into thin air.43 Networks and connections that were forged in the civil war 
had become redundant in peace times and with them the specific ideologies and identities 
attached to them. 
The analysis of the south-eastern Sierra Leonean warscape between 1991 and 1996 
illustrates the shifting dynamics of governable spaces over longer time periods and how 
relatively stable governable orders are reshuffled and reconfigured, creating moments and 
periods of greater instability and uncertainty. The governable space that emerged around 
the RUF bush camps in the first phase of the war was a fragile equilibrium held together 
by the relations that the RUF cadres, the camp inhabitants and the forest dwellers had 
developed. But this governable space disintegrated into a more ambivalent, less 
predictable and more violent one with the onset of an ‘oligopoly of violence’ by 
belligerents plundering and looting the population.44 These belligerents fashioned highly 
localized governable spaces of coercion, oppression and expropriation that made life for 
all warscape inhabitants a risky gamble of survival. Finally, the geography of the Sierra 
Leone civil war was also shaped by the physical terrain within which warscape 
inhabitants navigated. The bush as a complex terrain outside of the camps was 
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instrumental for different types of actors, RUF cadres, the CDF, bush inhabitants as a 
place of refuge, a source of threat and a manoeuvring space in times of instability. 
 
Eastern Sri Lanka, ca. 1999-2002 
In Sri Lanka’s multi-ethnic east, fifteen years of civil war, inter-ethnic violence, guerrilla 
tactics and regimes of terror saturated in a political economy of violence and 
appropriation with multiple co-existing orders and systems of rules towards the end of the 
1990s.45 During this period, before the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002, Sri 
Lanka’s east experienced a regime of low-intensity warfare with some territorial pockets 
held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), while other territory, mostly the 
coastal towns and major roads were under control of the government’s security forces. 
Localized battles and small-scale attacks took place regularly. In this situation, one could 
broadly distinguish four co-existing governable orders: (1) the remnants of the authority 
of the state apparatus, (2) the LTTE rule, (3) the rulings of the Sri Lankan security forces 
(often operating outside formal legal rules), and (4) the customary norms of caste, 
religion and class. These four parallel governable orders were configured very differently 
in dissimilar places and times, resulting in specific spatial regimes of order, power and 
coercion or governable space(s).  
Bargaining and fighting between combatants over their relative realms of power, 
both territorially and ideologically, defined the order of rules for peasants, fishermen, 
women, youngsters, bureaucrats and other people. The power differentials between the 
combatant groups fluctuated over time and space, and subsequently local governable 
spaces changed with these shifting power differentials. These variations occurred on 
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different time scales: for example, heavy fighting could shift the borderline or frontier 
between territory under government control and territory under LTTE control (in the Sri 
Lankan context, the former was called ‘cleared’, the latter ‘uncleared’, or not yet cleared, 
areas). But these frontiers were not fixed impermeable lines. Rather, the LTTE moved 
across those frontiers during night time when the rebels controlled most of the territory 
and the Sri Lankan security forces withdrew to their camps.  
For a peasant or fisherman, for example, this implied that the rules did not only 
change with the shifting military battle lines, but the order of rules and the rulers were 
different during the day when the security forces were in charge and during the night 
when the LTTE ruled. However, this situation was not of the sort that the peasant could 
simply switch to two different modes of living and two distinct orders of rule – the day 
and the night rule. Rather, the predominant governable space consisted of an overlap of 
these governable orders. They coincided in space and time and their institutional logic 
persisted, in varying guises, throughout day and night. The rules did not just vanish, but 
the relative importance of some rules vis-à-vis others varied between day and night. 
When performing an action A during daytime, a peasant had to consider what the 
implications were for his or her life during night time, or the other way round. For 
example, if the peasant paid taxes to the LTTE during the night, this was a reasonable 
thing to do under the order of LTTE rule, but it was a dangerous thing under the order of 
the military’s rule during the day. When peasants moved to specific places, the 
governable space changed as well. When peasants living in an uncleared area under 
LTTE control wanted to sell their agricultural products, they needed to go to market 
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towns that were located in cleared areas. They passed the frontier line between LTTE rule 
and military rule, but both rulers interrogated the peasant with suspicion.  
In this warscape, farmers, fishermen and local traders developed their own tactics at 
the interfaces of the different prevailing governable orders.46 Muslim traders, for 
example, were able to navigate between the conflict lines. As they were neither Tamil nor 
Sinhalese, they could deal with both LTTE and Sinhalese army officers. In many places 
at the Sri Lankan east coast, Muslim traders gradually established a trade monopoly as 
they bought produce from Tamil farmers and fishermen, which they managed to transport 
through a large number of military checkpoints to the markets outside of the war zone. 
Tamil traders were handicapped in this trade, as they could easily get in trouble at a 
checkpoint for being suspected as an LTTE spy. But Tamil farmers could also pay back 
by informing the LTTE on malpractices and unequal market exchanges with Muslim 
traders who would then be taxed or intimidated by the LTTE at night.47  
These practices of everyday survival and entrepreneurial activities entailed small 
opportunisms, the pursuit of self-interest and struggles over resources. ‘Ordinary’ people 
and combatants each played their role in this everyday geography of the eastern Sri 
Lankan warscape. The ambiguity of multiple governable orders created uncertainty and 
fear, while at the same time opening space to resist subordination, oppression, forced 
deference and humiliation. But often, resistance against a dominant governable order 
produced new violence and opportunisms, mostly against the ethnic other. With the 
shifting military dynamics and territorial control, land markets in the patchwork of Tamil 
and Muslim paddy fields periodically developed patterns of forced sales and unequal 
exchange.48 Sometimes, Muslims sold land at marginal prices to Tamil neighbours, when 
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they did not feel safe to go to their fields for cultivation (e.g. when the LTTE had the 
upper hand or when there were lots of fighting incidences). In other cases, Tamils sold 
land to Muslims. When Tamil-Muslim conflicts emerged, Tamil farmers would harvest 
the fields of their Muslim neighbours who were afraid to go to their fields and vice versa.  
In other places, Sinhalese farmers used the protection by the military to block the 
flow of irrigation water to Tamil and Muslim tail-enders and used up the water at the 
expense of the latter. They did so at night time, when it was too dangerous for the 
irrigation engineers – mostly ethnic Tamils – to come to these places. The latter were also 
reluctant to stop Sinhalese farmers from blocking channels as Sinhalese army and 
politicians could easily exert pressure on the Tamil engineers who worked for a Sinhalese 
dominated state.49 One can therefore posit that contrary to Scott’s understanding of 
peasant resistance, where the categories ‘good’ and ‘bad’ echo the analytical lens of class 
struggle, the weapons of the weak in Sri Lanka’s warscape of the east were muddier and 
opaque, located in a twilight of ambiguous and fluid governable spaces.50 
The Sri Lankan warscape was not confined to the territories of Sri Lanka, but 
extended into a transnational space of grievances, intimidation and taxation. Well known 
are the financial flows of Diaspora communities to both their extended families ‘at home’ 
and to rebel groups, a prominent example being the LTTE’s extraction of war taxes from 
Tamils living abroad.51 But these connections also play out in more convoluted ways, 
influencing governable orders and collective subjectivities. Fear, for example, often 
results in acceptance of rules even if there is no imminent local threat. People follow 
rules even though the acts that have created this fear have been conducted in a remote 
place (and other people have been the victims of it). But their legacy has travelled to 
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other places and other minds that have not directly experienced it, but have heard about it. 
Communication, including mouth-to-mouth information, can trigger remote responses, 
thereby spatially expanding intimidation beyond the place of immediate direct violence or 
suppression. 
The geography of warscape of this particular moment in Sri Lanka’s troubled history 
of violent conflict indicates the high volatility and relative stability of governable spaces. 
Control was highly volatile over time (day or night), but in a given place the logic of 
these shifting realignments of power and authority over day and night remained relatively 
stable. And yet, this relative stability and volatility was the sort of configuration that 
offered warscape inhabitants room for manoeuvre, or navigation, and small opportunistic 
economic gains in pursuit of one’s livelihoods. Arguably, this pattern of governable 
spaces that had emerged before 2002 did not survive the ceasefire agreement, when a 
major shift in relative positions among the major conflict parties occurred. The warscape 
in eastern Sri Lanka changed significantly, became ever more volatile and instable when 
in 2004 a split within the LTTE led to competing Tamil militant groups, which eventually 
led to the expulsion of the LTTE from the east in 2007.52 
 
Conclusion 
Watts once wrote that ‘violence might be understood as “struggles over geography”’ and 
alluded to ‘a geographer’s sensitivity to territory, location, to mapping and to the 
processes of confinement and exclusion’.53 We have suggested in this article that in order 
to understand the ‘condition of war’ and the everyday practices of warscape inhabitants, 
an analysis of such struggles over geography is required. The geography of warscape 
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emerges out of the complex interplay of competing systems of authority and power that 
we have called governable orders. While governable orders are essentially rationales of 
rule, the ordering of these competing orders – how these different rules are hierarchically 
ordered and experienced in everyday situations – is malleable in different empirical time-
spaces, which we have named governable spaces. 
The two empirical vignettes that we have taken from Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka 
were suggestive in this respect. The Sierra Leonean warscape of the mid-1990s 
exemplifies the shifting dynamics of governable spaces over longer time periods and how 
the biophysical topography becomes an important parameter in defining places of relative 
insecurity and security. The bush as the outside space of the RUF camps that once 
provided some kind of stability became a prime source of threat when the power balance 
between the fighting parties and accompanying territorial control shifted. In the eastern 
Sri Lankan warscape before 2002, we illustrated the relative stability and concomitant 
fluidity of competing governable orders when the battlefield was relatively settled. And 
yet, such fragile equilibriums can quickly unravel as happened in Sri Lanka’s east after 
the ceasefire agreement, and in particular when a split in the LTTE occurred in 2004. 
A number of authors have suggested that civilian, non-combatant, ordinary, often 
marginalized actors – subsumed as ‘the weak’ – dispose of tactic agency in warscapes.54 
We have argued that agency emerges at the ambiguous interface of different governable 
orders and the territorial and temporal fluidity of governable spaces in warscapes. In 
other words, an individual’s ability to navigate through governable spaces cannot be 
understood independently of time and place. Ambiguity creates both threats and 
opportunities, but the implications for navigation may be quite different for an individual 
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in a particular period and location.55 The examples from Sri Lanka (Muslim traders, 
Sinhalese farmers) indicate this. What at one point is an opportunity, to make business, to 
pursue a livelihood, can also become a threat (of extortion, of becoming killed) at another 
point (place and time).  
These struggles and life projects of warscape inhabitants take place; they are strongly 
embedded in governable spaces of a given time and in a given locality, they relate to, 
circumvent and reproduce competing governable orders, and they are part of (local and 
global) social networks that territorialize in the warscape itself. We have argued that it is 
useful to analyse the geography of warscape as it reveals the dynamics of ‘ragged, 
unstable, perhaps ungovernable, spaces’ and indicates the social mechanisms that 
produce agency, threat and opportunity, stability and instability, security and insecurity in 
the social condition of war.56 In this sense, warscapes can be interpreted as struggles over 
geography. Indeed, as Edward Said wrote, ‘just as none of us is outside or beyond 
geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography.’57 
23 
Notes 
This article has navigated through turbulent intellectual terrain from its initial ideas to its final 
shape. Along the way Jutta Bakonyi, Christine Bichsel, Roland Bleiker, Bart Klem, Carolyn 
Nordstrom, Tania Murray Li and Lilith Schärer have provided us with critical, incisive and 
encouraging comments that have influenced our argument. 
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